Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

The following table was used in preparation and as working document for the EuroPris Roundtable Roundtable on Prison Intelligence in Relation to Organised Crime in Brussels in May 2024. It contains the five areas: Identification, Risk level, Detention Plan, Intelligence structure and Monitoring process.

Identification of Organised Crime Members:

Who identifies those individuals involved in organised crime in prisons? How are they identified, and do you apply specific criteria?

COUNTRY	IDENTIFICATION	
	Who?	How? Criteria?
Austria	By the **prison** service By **external** policy authorities	• According to the documentation from the court (organised crime - criminal offense under the Criminal Code) • By investigation done by prison intelligence units (Definition based on the offense under the Criminal Code and internal criteria)
Belgium	By **external** security partners	There are **no specific criteria**, the **network/scope of the case** determines whether a prisoner should be monitored.
Catalonia	By the **prison** service	Prisoners who are **part of an internal or external illegal organisation and/or radical ideological groups** that **may pose a risk to the internal security of the prison.**

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Identification of Organised Crime Members: *(continued)*

Who identifies those individuals involved in organised crime in prisons? How are they identified, and do you apply specific criteria?

COUNTRY	IDENTIFICATION	
	Who?	How? Criteria?
Czech Republic	By the **prison service** Law enforcement authority (a national police, public prosecutor, or other authority)	There are **no specific criteria**, just a general definition of organised crime.
Finland	By the **prison** service	Criteria / Based **on overall consideration:** Prisoners and remand prisoners who are related with organised crime.
Italy	By the **sentence**	**Criminal association and mafia association** (Penal Code art. 416 and 416bis)
Scotland	By **external** Police authority	Police Scotland conduct organised crime mapping and provide data to SPS every quarter. Entry packages are also provided by Police Scotland to advise of any known high-risk OCG individuals prior to entering custody.
Sweden	By the **prison** service with the help from policy authorities	The Prison and Probation Service use the **EU criteria for organised crime** but the connection to OC varies for the prisoners we monitor in particular.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Identification of Organised Crime Members: *(continued)*

Who identifies those individuals involved in organised crime in prisons? How are they identified, and do you apply specific criteria?

COUNTRY	IDENTIFICATION	
	Who?	How? Criteria?
Spain	By the **prison** service	According to the **documentation from the court, by information provided by law enforcement agencies** and by **investigation done by prison intelligence units.**
The Netherlands	By the **prison** service	This decision **is based on information from the Dutch Custodial Institution Agency and other organisations,** such as police and public prosecution office. This decision-making process examines risks and threats to the order and safety of the prison and to the safety of society.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

The following table was used in preparation and as working document for the EuroPris Roundtable Roundtable on Prison Intelligence in Relation to Organised Crime in Brussels in May 2024. It contains the five areas: Identification, Risk level, Detention Plan, Intelligence structure and Monitoring process.

Risk Level of Organised Crime Members:

How do you assess risk? Do you use risk assessment tools?

COUNTRY	RISK LEVEL	
	Risk Assessment?	Tools?
Austria	**Screening of all occupants** for dangers to persons, danger against objects, security and order based on a legal provision.	
Belgium	There is **no assessment** made.	There are **no tools** used.
Catalonia	Gathering **internal information of the prisoner** (incidents, disciplinary misconducts, etc) by the interior security units of each prison.	**General risk assessment tool (not specifically for OC)**
Czech Republic	The risk is **not specifically assessed**, only a specific crime according to the Criminal Code.	General tools for **assessing the risks of organised crime are not used**, only in the case of extremism an **online database** of asset risks is used according to specific criteria.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Risk Level of Organised Crime Members: *(continued)*

How do you assess risk? Do you use risk assessment tools?

COUNTRY	RISK LEVEL	
	Risk assessment?	Tools?
Finland	**Risk assessment** is a cornerstone of sentence plan, which will be drawn up to **every prisoner**.	There are a lot of **different methods** concerning the risk assessment, but **none of them is specifically tailored for OC.**
Italy	There are **three categories of prisoners** (articles 13 and 14 of the Penitentiary Act): ▪ high security prisoners ▪ medium security prisoners ▪ basic security prisoners Offenders charged with and **sentenced for criminal and mafia association are included in the high security category.**	The principal issues and key risks concern the category of Medium and Basic Security, where a circular letter of the Penitentiary Administration dated 24 November 2011 n. 445330 introduces «A NEW MODEL OF TREATMENT WHICH INCLUDES SECURITY, CARE AND REINTEGRATION». A kind of OPEN REGIME for non-dangerous people. Since 2012, several provisions issued by the Department of penitentiary Administration, regulated and encouraged the enforcement of the new modalities of detention. In particular, in 2013 a circular letter was issued concerning «Guidelines on dynamic surveillance» and in 2015 a circular letter was issued concerning «Modalities of enforcement of sentences». In details, the DYNAMIC SURVEILLANCE encouraged also by the European standards related to detention. For Medium and Basic Security categories, Italian Penitentiary system must face some risks.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Risk Level of Organised Crime Members: *(continued)*

How do you assess risk? Do you use risk assessment tools?

COUNTRY	RISK LEVEL	
	Risk assessment?	Tools?
Scotland	General risk assessment carried out by SPS in relation to a prisoner's internal supervision level. Formal risk assessments carried out by social work and psychology partners in relation to risk of re-offending and risk of harm. These risk assessment tools are generic to all population types and there is no specific risk assessment tool for those involved in organised crime. The SPS currently uses Extreme Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+) for individuals with extremism-related convictions. Prisoners who are subject to post-release supervision are managed under the Enhanced Integrated Case Management process which involves risk assessment, multi-agency case conferencing and sentence planning.	**Prisoner Supervision System (PSS)** – is an assessment tool to determine level of internal supervision – high, medium and low. However, this is **used for all prisoners and is not specific to organised crime.We are exploring the use of MoRiLE (Management of Risk in Law Enforcement)** which is used by Police Scotland and other criminal justice agencies to assess the threat, harm and risk of OC individuals and groups.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Risk Level of Organised Crime Members: *(continued)*

How do you assess risk? Do you use risk assessment tools?

COUNTRY	RISK LEVEL	
	Risk assessment?	Tools?
Sweden	The Prison and Probation Service has a **general risk assessment process** (not specifically for OC) and **four categories of prisons/prisoners)** ▪ max security prisoners ▪ high security prisoners ▪ medium security prisoners ▪ basic security prisoners	The Prison and Probation Service has **different methods** concerning the risk assessment, but **none of them is specifically tailored for OC.**
Spain	In Spain there is a **categorisation for high-risk prisoners in a specific file** (FIES) According to the risk they present, there are: ▪ Upper level of OC (FIES 2 upper level) ▪ OC (FIES 2) ▪ Member of Juvenile gangs (FIES 5)	There is not such a tool, just a specific file for dangerous prisoners where the OC members are included according to their rank or their role in the organisation. The inclusion in this file also means a specific monitoring. The file´s name is **FIES (Fichero para internos de especial seguimiento):** File for prisoners with special monitoring.
The Netherlands	Depending on the regime, **it is periodically assessed whether the prisoner still meets the criteria of the regime (with associated restrictive measures).** The information underlying this must be current, reliable and concrete. **Information is collected by monitoring prison behaviour by prison staff and prison intelligence, and via other organisations** such as the police and the prosecution office. Cooperation with these counterparts is being strengthened, but is still in development. In 2025, the Detention Intelligence Unit (DIU) was established. Within the DIU, the Public Prosecution Service, the National Police and the Dutch Custodial Institutions Agency collaborate on analyses and the preparation of information products about prisoners.	There is **no assessment too**l yet regarding prisoners related to organised crime. The Dutch Custodial Institutions Agency is currently conducting a study to develop **a risk-assessment tool and resocialisation activities for these high-risk prisoners.**

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

The following table was used in preparation and as working document for the EuroPris Roundtable Roundtable on Prison Intelligence in Relation to Organised Crime in Brussels in May 2024. It contains the five areas: Identification, Risk level, Detention Plan, Intelligence structure and Monitoring process.

Detention plan for organised crime members:

Is there a type of regime, specific management plans or special security measures applied? Do you deliver any interventions/deterrence programmes specific to organised crime?

COUNTRY	DETENTION PLAN	
	Regime?	Interventions programmes?
Austria	**Mandatory enforcement** plan by a multi-professional specialist team. **Risk-need-responsivity model** There is no specific regulation, but there is **specific monitoring** (at the level of the prison and the Ministry of Justice -> Prison Intelligence Officer) **and reporting obligations**. They **cannot have access to some of the job position** inside the prison where the trust between prisoner and staff is required. Target group-specific regular exchange between prisons Ministry of Justice and on-site monitoring.	
Belgium	There is a **regime** based on more isolation, more control and less privacy.	

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Detention plan for organised crime members: *(continued)*

Is there a type of regime, specific management plans or special security measures applied? Do you deliver any interventions/deterrence programmes specific to organised crime?

COUNTRY	DETENTION PLAN	
	Regime?	Interventions programmes?
Catalonia	Catalonia does **not have a specific detention plan**; it is the same as for other high-risk profile. If prisoners have been involved in any incident, the service can apply isolation regime and security measures, but due to their behaviour, not the OC risk.	First, the OC plan should begin when the prison detects an OC risk, which could not be during the admission. Once Catalonia detected that risk, the rehabilitation team will build **an individual intervention plan (no specific rehabilitation programmes) and the prison service apply supervision measures** (behaviour, group of influence, communications etc).
Czech Republic	There is **not any specific type of regime**, specific management plans or special security measures applied.	**Preventing contact** of individual members - applied individual approach.
Finland	Individuals related to OC are placed in wards of **intensified supervision or high security wards** (decision can be made on arrival or during sentence according to up-to-date assessment / intelligence analysis.) Transfer to the more open facilities requires notable changes in behaviour, position and relations related to OC.	**There are no OC-specific rehabilitation programs.** Exit-program is individually tailored model for individuals motivated leaving OC.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Detention plan for organised crime members: *(continued)*

Is there a type of regime, specific management plans or special security measures applied? Do you deliver any interventions/deterrence programmes specific to organised crime?

COUNTRY	DETENTION PLAN	
	Regime?	Interventions programmes?
Italy	The High Security category was established in the need to prevent that mixing offenders belonging to mafia-type criminal organisations or to terrorist organisations with the rest of the prison population («ordinary» prisoners). Article 32 of the Decree n. 230/2000 provides for: "Prisoners and internees whose behaviour demands special precautionary measures, also to safeguard other prisoners from possible aggression or abuse, shall be **assigned to special institutions or wings where such precautionary measures shall be adopted more easily**." Regime 41-bis Regime of special surveillance (art. 14b Penit. Act).	Article 4-bis of the Penitentiary Act (L. 354/75) provides for a list of crimes which prevent the perpetrators or alleged perpetrators to ask for any penitentiary benefits (alternative measures, licences, conditional release, etc.). Those crimes include, inter alia: Ø Mafia-type criminal association Ø Trafficking of human beings Ø International drug trafficking Ø Paedo-pornography Ø Domestic and international terrorism. Offenders charged with and sentenced for the above-mentioned crimes are included in the High Security category.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Detention plan for organised crime members: *(continued)*

Is there a type of regime, specific management plans or special security measures applied? Do you deliver any interventions/deterrence programmes specific to organised crime?

COUNTRY	DETENTION PLAN	
	Regime?	Interventions programmes?
Scotland	**No specific regime for those involved in organised crime**, however, there is **a range of special security measures and management tools** that Scotland can utilise in order to manage risk. • Rule 95 – to remove the individual from general association (segregation). • Special security measures – dictates frequency of cell searches, restrictions on movements within the prison, use of handcuffs when out with cell etc. • Prison rules permit the service to have restrictions on mail and telephone calls if deemed necessary. • Risk Management Plan (RMP) – for those deemed of significant high risk by the courts and/or subject to an Order of Lifelong Restriction. RMP's are jointly agreed by Head of Psychology and Deputy Governor and must be approved by an external body – Risk Management Authority. • Separate process for assessing risk and managing terrorist offenders.	**No specific interventions targeting involvement in organised crime**, however, Scotland has a range of interventions relating to general problem solving, violence, substance misuse etc. For high-risk individuals the prison service can also commission a Psychological Risk Assessment and deliver bespoke one to one work.
Sweden	**Specific management and regime in max security prisons,** where the prisoners live in a highly controlled environment. There is possibility to interact with other, except staff and the other five prisoners in the cellblocks, are limited and controlled. **For other prisoners,** all decisions are based on **individual assessments.** Rights, such as calling or meeting relatives, may be granted, but **affiliation to organised crime is considered** in the assessment.	There is a **special Exit-program** aimed at prisoners who want to leave organised crime and prisoners with links to organised crime can also participate in **more general crime prevention programs**.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Detention plan for organised crime members: *(continued)*

Is there a type of regime, specific management plans or special security measures applied? Do you deliver any interventions/deterrence programmes specific to organised crime?

COUNTRY	DETENTION PLAN	
	Regime?	Interventions programmes?
Spain	There is **not a specific regime** but a **specific monitorisation for each of the different risk level.** The prison system doesn't allow them to share allocation or activity. They cannot have access to some of the job position inside the prison where the trust between prisoner and staff is required.	Organised crime prisoners do not have a special regime and are included in modules based on their profile evaluated in the admission department. Unless they present extreme danger or it is necessary to adopt specific security measures, in which case they would be allocated in isolation modules. Nevertheless. this situation is reviewed every three months
The Netherlands	There are different regimes within the prison system. **The regimes differ in the severity of security measures.** The basic principle is that if the risks and/or threat decrease, and the prisoner shows good behaviour, the prisoner can scale down to a regular regime (with less restrictive measures and more resocialisation activities) in phases. There are few resocialisation activities offered in the high-risk regimes, such as work or study. These activities will be closely monitored and are only allowed when risks can be managed.	Regarding organised crime prisoners there is **no intervention program (yet).** There is **no assessment** tool yet regarding prisoners related to organised crime. The Dutch Custodial Institutions Agency is currently conducting a study to develop **a risk-assessment tool and resocialisation activities for these high-risk prisoners.**

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

The following table was used in preparation and as working document for the EuroPris Roundtable Roundtable on Prison Intelligence in Relation to Organised Crime in Brussels in May 2024. It contains the five areas: Identification, Risk level, Detention Plan, Intelligence structure and Monitoring process.

Penitentiary intelligence structure

What is the intelligence structure within your organisation, including responsibilities and areas of expertise?

COUNTRY	INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE	
	Structure	Responsibilities/Areas of expertise
Austria	MoJ: ▪ Department for Security and Extremism Prevention ▪ Prison intelligence Officer Prisons: All prisons have internal security units: ▪ risk assessment and management in all prison establishments Austria is currently working on the establishment of Prison Intelligence Units in focus prisons.	Prison intelligence aims **to identify imprisoned people (extremists and terrorists, members of organised crime groups) and other individuals (visitors, employees and organisations) that are planning or carrying out illegal activities that pose a danger to the security and order inside a prison.** It intends to prevent said criminal activities (ideally) before they manifest themselves in actions.
Belgium	At central level, within the **Integral security service the cell** extremism (CelEx). At a **local level**, one of the directors of each prison has been designated as **security and safety director**. One of his roles is the follow-up of high-risk detainees.	Monitoring terrorist profiles, but not OCM. One of their roles is the follow-up of high-risk detainees.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

The following table was used in preparation and as working document for the EuroPris Roundtable Roundtable on Prison Intelligence in Relation to Organised Crime in Brussels in May 2024. It contains the five areas: Identification, Risk level, Detention Plan, Intelligence structure and Monitoring process.

Penitentiary intelligence structure

What is the intelligence structure within your organisation, including responsibilities and areas of expertise?

COUNTRY	INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE	
	Structure	Responsibilities/Areas of expertise
Catalonia	**Headquarters security unit** **Security interior units** – risk assessment and management in all prison establishments	
Czech Republic	There is **not a separate department** that deals with intelligence issues - only separate sections (e.g. within the Prison sentence department or Prevention and complaints department) that deal with this activity and are only marginally involved.	

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence structure: *(continued)*

What is the intelligence structure within your organisation, including responsibilities and areas of expertise?

COUNTRY	INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE	
	Structure	Responsibilities/Areas of expertise
Finland	National Crime Prevention Team **Local security group** (in every closed prison /2-6 prison officers & dog handlers)	In **charge of prison intelligence on the national level.** Main goal is to prevent crime in prison together with cooperation partners. Team is also in charge of development of intelligence structure, OC-Exit, strategic and operational analysis (information for decision making), joint situation overview, cooperation with the National Bureau of Investigation and the National Police Board. Local security groups have focus on **operational analysis, identification of individuals related to OC, individual security measures, search measures, cooperation with local authorities, providing analysed information for decision makers in prison etc.**
Italy	NIC - **Nucleo Investigativo centrale** (Central Investigation Unit) detachment of the Penitentiary Police Corps. It contains itself of 11 **Regional Investigation Units (NIR)** and of **the detachments of Penitentiary Police** deployed in the prisons. GOM – **Gruppo Operativo Mobile** (Special Intervention Team). Specialized detachment of the Corps of Penitentiary Police	Activities of **judicial police under the directions of the Judicial Authorities** for crimes perpetrated in prisons or directly connected with the prison environment **Surveillance and observation of the prisoners submitted to the special detention regime** provided for by art. 41-b, paragraph 2, of the Penitentiary Act.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence structure: *(continued)*

What is the intelligence structure within your organisation, including responsibilities and areas of expertise?

COUNTRY	INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE	
	Structure	Responsibilities/Areas of expertise
Scotland	Each establishment has a **local intelligence management unit (IMU)** which consists of 2 intelligence analysts and a manager. There is also a **National Public Protection Unit** based at SPS Headquarters. Their role is to oversee consistent delivery of SPS Intelligence Framework across establishments and provide support, direction and guidance to local IMU's. **Each individual Governor** is responsible for prisoners within their respective prisons and are the decision makers for any tactical, strategical and covert options to manage individuals involved in OC.	They are responsible for the **analysis, investigation, dissemination and management of all intelligence.** They are also responsible for working closely with Police Scotland intelligence partners. National Public Protection Unit are responsible for **national control strategies, policy development and resources.**
Sweden	• The Prison and Probation Service has a **nationwide intelligence structure.** • On **national level** there is an intelligence unit that **leads and controls** the intelligence service in the correctional service. The national level **helps the national decision-makers** with information and support. • On **local level** there is **intelligence officers** in max, high and most of the medium security prisons and in some custodies and probation offices. The officers **help the local decision-makers** with information & support and they also process incoming information in the intelligence database. • At all levels within the intelligence structure there is **collaboration with the police** and other authorities.	The intelligence unit has an **overall monitoring responsibility** for prisoners with connections to **organised crime**.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence structure: *(continued)*

What is the intelligence structure within your organisation, including responsibilities and areas of expertise?

COUNTRY	INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE	
	Structure	Responsibilities/Areas of expertise
Spain	• Periodic meetings are held with CITCO, which is the intelligence centre against terrorism and organised crime at the national level. • Coordination Unit (police and prison members) at the Headquarters • Internal security direction (prison staff) at the headquarters • Control and operational unit (Prison staff) in all prison centres.	Reports form the mentioned units are supporting responsible for decision makings in terms of management inside prison and security measures once released.
The Netherlands	In every prison there is a **local intelligence and security office.** There is also **a national intelligence and security office** to identify threats and developments regarding high-risk prisoners at a national level. Work is underway to establish a **detention intelligence unit (DIU)**. The DIU is a partnership between the police, the public prosecutor's office and the prison system.	Their task is to gain insight into high-risk prisoners within the walls of the prison in question. Look at national phenomena and criminal networks. The task of the national office is to gain insight into cross-institutional developments with regard to continued criminal conduct from detention.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

The following table was used in preparation and as working document for the EuroPris Roundtable Roundtable on Prison Intelligence in Relation to Organised Crime in Brussels in May 2024. It contains the five areas: Identification, Risk level, Detention Plan, Intelligence structure and Monitoring process.

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
Austria	• Separation of prisoners of the same group • Individual security measures • Verification and monitoring of outside contacts • Search measures • Internal case analysis within a multi-professional team • Close Inter-agency cooperation and standardised information exchange • (two-dimensional) Administration • reporting of events	• Development and adaption of guidelines/standards • Development and adaption training content • Improving of data bases and management • (on-site) inspections
Belgium	Monitoring is only for extremists/terrorists.	Provide information based on observations in the prisons to external security services, including the services in charge of intelligence.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process: *(continued)*

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
Catalonia	• Search for information and detection of risk indicators. • Monitoring and investigation of risk indicators and their evaluation. • Coordination with the headquarters, for the transmission of information and application of security measures. • Elevation of specific risk profile proposals. • Programming and monitoring of systematic security measures (relocation of prisoners, incompatibilities, searches, requests, CCTV monitoring...) • Programming and supervision of special security measures (specific observations, investigation files, communications intervention, radiological search control, canine units, etc.) • Information extension files for informative releases. • Evaluation of incompatibilities and negative affinities. • Prison sociogram of groups and their leadership. • Analysis of serious regimental incidents • Diffusion and transfer of information ▪ Security analysis ▪ Monitoring and prisoners follow up ▪ Risk indicators • Drills	• Develop the internal procedures and define the personal and material resources to comply with the regulations for monitoring high-risk prisoners according to the circumstances and characteristics of each penitentiary establishment. • Establish clear circuits to manage all the information related to internal and external security and regimental order, carry out an analysis of possible existing risks and propose measures to the prison management team in order to avoid them or minimise their effects. In short, facilitate the decision-making in matters of security for the management team and/or other prison managers. • To provide support and structure to the interior sub-directorate of each penitentiary establishment in everything related to dynamic security.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process: *(continued)*

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
Czech republic	• Close cooperation with the Law enforcement authority (a national police, public prosecutor, or other authority) or their independent activity in prisons with/without the knowledge of the prison service. • The check on mail correspondence. • Recording and monitoring of telephone calls.	Separate sections of prison service (e.g. within the Prison sentence department or Prevention and complaints department) monitor the activity and forward the findings to the law enforcement authorities. In specific cases, prison service takes urgent measures.
Finland	• The check on mail correspondence. • Close cooperation with other authorities. • The monitoring of visits in person and telephone calls. • Close cooperation with Client Assessment Unit. • Comprehensive collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to decision-makers.	The concept of prison intelligence is under development process as Prison and Probation Service is moving forward to the next phase of organisation reform. There are several issues and procedures that need to be improved in terms of changing security environment. Prison intelligence constitutes a key cornerstone in maintaining prison security, preventing crimes, and ensuring an up-to-date situational picture. Effective cooperation between different authorities is essential.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process: *(continued)*

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
Italy	• The check on mail correspondence. • The monitoring of visits in person and telephone calls. • The monitoring of the purchases at prison shop, of reception of parcels as well as of any other service relevant to the above-mentioned prisoners. • Surveillance and observation of the prisoners who cooperate with justice (turning State's witnesses). • Transfers and guarding of prisoners. For reasons of security and secrecy, these services can be carried out with operational modalities derogating from the administrative provisions currently in force. • Surveillance and observation of the prisoners charged with or sentenced for crimes of domestic or international terrorism, specifically, although not submitted to the special detention regime provided for by art. 41-b, paragraph 2, of the Penitentiary Act. • Upon order of the Head of Department, the G.O.M. can be deployed: ▪ In the cases provided for by article 41-b, paragraph 1, of the Penitentiary Act; ▪ In any other emergency situation in the penitentiary system.	Provide information based on **observations** in the prisons to external security services, including the services in charge of intelligence.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process: *(continued)*

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
Scotland	• Covert surveillance tactics available for deployment • Recording and monitoring of telephone calls • Monitoring of visits • Close partnership working with Police Scotland and the National Crime Agency. • Monthly SOCG mapping data shared by Police Scotland. • Co-ordination and analysis of all local intelligence to provide national overview. • Development of prisoner profiles to aid decision making in relation to risk management • Local and national Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination meeting in place to identify local and national resources and strategic and tactical plans to detect and disrupt OG activity. • Prison Rules allow interception of prisoner correspondence where authorised by the Governor-in-Charge.	The role of the local IMU's is to analyse and develop local intelligence to support senior management decision making in relation to prisoner management and the deployment of tactical plans. This is with the view to divert, detect, deter and disrupt organised crime.
Sweden	• The check on mail correspondence. • The monitoring of visits in person and telephone calls. • The monitoring of how the prisoners interact. • Assessments and information sharing to decision makers. • Close partnership with the Police authority. The information regarding prisoners with connections to OC is processed in the intelligence database and shared to all staff in the intelligence service.	The intelligence service is only advisory and does not carry out its own countermeasures.

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process: *(continued)*

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
Spain	Monitoring Organised Crime members implies: ▪ Communication interventions ▪ Regular searching ▪ Separation form others OC members ▪ Specific allocation in the prisons. ▪ Supervised access to specific work positions. ◦ Monitoring the prison itinerary from entry to exit and the possible prison benefits to which they may have access.	Prison level, control and operational units. Collect information at the penitentiary level and carry out an operational analysis of it and transfer it to: ◦ decision-making capacities of the penitentiary centre itself (Management teams). ◦ to the intelligence bodies of the Management Centre. Internal security direction, that analyse the information from the penitentiary centres, to provide intelligence reports (operational or strategic) for making them available to Authorities and bodies with decision-making capacity of the penitentiary structure. Coordination Unit. To share information coming from the penitentiary centres and form external sources. CITCO, national centre for counterterrorism and organised crime) Police operations In addition, there is a Unit with administrative powers in the monitoring and evolution of prisoners included in the High-Risk Prisoners file (FIES).

Penitentiary intelligence: Identify and share best practice relating to the management of individuals involved in organised crime within prisons

Penitentiary intelligence monitoring process: *(continued)*

What is the monitoring-processes for those involved in organised crime in prisons? What role does the prison intelligence service play in the information processes for these profiles?

COUNTRY	PENITENTIARY INTELLIGENCE	
	Monitoring?	Role
The Netherlands	• Monitoring contacts with outside world. • Continuing to monitor whether certain criminal networks change during detention. • Interpersonal relationships between at-risk detainees. • Mutual relationships and behaviour between at-risk detainees. • Assessments and information sharing to decision makers. • Close partnership with partner organisations.	Prison intelligence covers multiple layers: at the individual level, institutional level and national level. This means that intelligence and information can play a role in taking measures against an individual prisoner, such as transfer to a more severe regime. But it is also possible to take measures per prison: such as organising extensive searches. Finally, at a national level it is examined whether there are trends and phenomena against which measures need to be taken.